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An attention-based view of family firm adaptation to discontinuous technological change: 
Exploring the role of family CEOs’ non-economic goals 
 
ABSTRACT 
Recent studies show that managerial attention is a particularly important precursor of established 
firms’ responses to discontinuous technological change. However, little is known about the factors 
that shape managerial attention-response patterns. In our qualitative study, we investigate how the 
attention of family firm CEOs to discontinuous technological shifts, the interpretation and decision 
making processes associated with these changes, and ultimately organizations’ responses are 
affected by CEOs’ non-economic goals. Based on seven longitudinal case studies in the German 
consumer goods industry, we induce a process model that extends the findings of the literature on 
the attention-based view and helps to explain heterogeneity in family firms’ adaptation to 
discontinuous technological change. We show that the family CEO’s specific non-economic 
goals—such as power and control, transgenerational value, the maintenance of family reputation, 
the continuance of personal ties, or personal affect associated with the family business—determine 
whether the CEO assesses an emerging technology as relevant enough to warrant a reaction from 
the firm. Moreover, the family CEO’s non-economic goals constrain the set of considered 
responses. The outcome of this sensemaking process determines the organization’s response. For 
instance, in the specific context of this study, the goal of “family power and control” entailed an 
immediate interpretation of the focal trend as important for maintaining influence, and resulted in 
an unconstrained set of responses and, ultimately, high innovation in the new domain. Over time, 
family CEOs might re-evaluate the emerging trend based on their goals and adapt organizational 
moves accordingly. We identify and discuss how ambiguities and dilemmas may arise during this 
process. Our findings contribute to the literature on adaptation to discontinuous technological 
change and to family firm research. 
 
 
 
Keywords: discontinuous technological change, family firm, attention-based view, non-economic 
goal, sensemaking, innovation  
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INTRODUCTION 
Adaptation to discontinuous technological change constitutes one of the most difficult challenges 
for established organizations (e.g., Christensen and Bower, 1996, Danneels, 2004, Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003). Recent research on this topic highlights the protagonist role of cognitive-
emotional factors, which can cause incumbents to overlook and misinterpret such radical 
environmental breakthroughs (e.g., Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). In 
particular, studies have illuminated the effects of top managers’ attention (Ocasio, 1997) in the 
context of discontinuous technological change (e.g., Kaplan, 2008, Maula, Keil and Zahra, 2013, 
Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000). For instance, Maula et al. (2013) recently showed how network partners 
affected the attention managers paid to upcoming changes in the information and communication 
industry and, ultimately, their organizations’ adaptations to those changes.  
 Despite those recent advancements, we still lack knowledge about how one particularly 
noteworthy but underinvestigated aspect of managerial attention plays out in the context of 
discontinuous technological change and potentially causes variance in adaptation behavior: the 
CEOs’ sets of non-economic goals (Danneels, 2004) that are known to play a vital role, in particular 
in family firms (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson and Barnett, 2012), one of the most important 
organizational types worldwide (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). While an abundant body of literature 
indicates that organizational actors often pursue various goals (Cyert and March, 1963), the effect 
of goals other than profitability on CEOs’ attention has largely been neglected (cf. Greve, 2008).   
In particular, family firm research has long emphasized that family firms pursue non-
economic goals (Chrisman, et al., 2012) beyond economic purposes, as they strive to preserve their 
socioemotional wealth (Berrone, Cruz and Gomez-Mejia, 2012). Such non-economic goals have 
been found to substantially affect family firm behavior (Chrisman and Patel, 2012, Gomez-Mejia, 
Haynes, Nunez-Nickel, Jacobson and Moyano-Fuentes, 2007).  
 As the CEOs of different family businesses might pursue different non-economic goals 
(Berrone, et al., 2012), non-economic goals might help explain variance in family firms’ 
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adaptations to discontinuous technological change. Although researchers agree that there is 
substantial variance among family firms in general (Zahra, Hayton and Salvato, 2004) and that it is 
important to study such heterogeneity (Chua, Chrisman, Steier and Rau, 2012), how and why family 
firms act heterogeneously when confronted with discontinuous technological change remains 
unclear. Therefore, we aim to answer the following research questions: (1) How does the family 
CEO’s attention to non-economic goals affect his or her sensemaking process and, subsequently, 
organizational adaptation to discontinuous technological change? and (2) How and why does 
heterogeneity in family CEOs’ non-economic goals lead to heterogeneity in the respective family 
firms’ adaptations to discontinuous technological change? 
 To answer those questions, we build on seven case studies of German family firms, which 
allow us to develop an attention-based model (Ocasio, 1997, 2011) of the effect of non-economic 
goals on family firms’ adaptations to discontinuous technologies. Given the large number of family 
firms around the world and across industries, their substantial impact on the economy (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003), and their structural and behavioral idiosyncrasies (König, Kammerlander and 
Enders, 2013), a more nuanced understanding of how and why family firms adapt to discontinuous 
technological changes is crucial for understanding technology adaptation and family firm behavior.  
 Our study contributes to the extant literature in three ways. First, we contribute to the research 
on discontinuous technological change (e.g., Christensen, 2006, Danneels, 2004) by revealing how 
non-economic goals of key decision makers can act as barriers or enablers of organizational 
adaptation to discontinuous technological change.  
 Second, we contribute to research on family businesses. In this regard, this study is one of the 
first to integrate Ocasio’s seminal concept of the attention-based view (1997, 2011) into family 
business research and to use it to explain the organizational behavior of family firms. In particular, 
we show how family CEOs’ differences in underlying values and motivations, which can be linked 
to dimensions of socioemotional wealth (Berrone, et al., 2012, Gómez-Mejía, Cruz, Berrone and 
Castro, 2011), result in heterogeneity of adaptation patterns among family firms.  
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 Third, we contribute to the ongoing discussion on innovation in family businesses (see De 
Massis, Frattini and Lichtenthaler, 2013 for an overview). In the last decade, scholars have become 
increasingly interested in explaining the particularities of innovativeness in family firms. This 
stream of research shows that family firms vary in their innovation input (i.e., R&D intensity) 
depending on intra-family conflicts (Block, 2010), the family’s risk propensity (Munari, Oriani and 
Sobrero, 2010), and firm performance (Chrisman and Patel, 2012). However, with few exceptions 
(Bergfeld and Weber, 2011, König, et al., 2013), the context of discontinuous technologies has been 
largely overlooked. Moreover, while we have deep knowledge of the input and output variables that 
explain innovation in family firms, we lack a profound understanding of the innovation processes in 
those firms, especially of why family businesses choose to engage in certain innovation activities 
(De Massis, Sharma, Chua and Chrisman, 2012). Our insights are also relevant for practitioners, as 
we raise awareness of non-economic goals and highlight their consequences. Moreover, we provide 
several examples of how family firms can master the challenges posed by discontinuous change. 
 In the following, we will first outline extant literature on discontinuous technological change, 
attention, and non-economic goals in family firms before describing our qualitative research 
approach. Subsequently, we present our overall model, describe the individual cases, and compare 
them in a cross-case analysis. We conclude by discussing our results.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Adaptation to Discontinuous Technological Change and the Attention-based View 
Discontinuous technologies, which are frequently labeled as “disruptive” or “radical,” are defined 
as technological innovations that deviate non-paradigmatically from the previous product-
development trajectory (Christensen and Bower, 1996, Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). Such 
innovations typically possess radically new features, involve fundamentally new processes, and/or 
are based on new business models (König, Schulte and Enders, 2012). Frequently cited examples of 
discontinuous technologies include minicomputers (Christensen and Bower, 1996), 
biopharmaceuticals (Kaplan, Murray and Henderson, 2003), and digital photography (Tripsas, 
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2009). In many cases, discontinuous technologies are first commercialized by new entrants before 
being adopted by incumbent firms (Christensen and Bower, 1996). Many (but not all) established 
organizations experience difficulties in adopting such discontinuous technologies and often react 
with inertia, particularly in the early phases of technology development (Danneels, 2004, Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986). Due to numerous economic, emotional, and cognitive reasons (Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003), such organizations may react late (Miller and Friesen, 1980), with low resource 
commitment (Christensen, 1997), with low stamina (König, et al., 2013), or with insufficient 
reconfigurations of internal routines (Gilbert, 2005).  
 Scholars have long sought to explain heterogeneity in organizational adaptation to 
discontinuous technological change (Maula, et al., 2013, Mitchell, 1989). In recent years, research 
has increasingly focused on applying cognitive perspectives to explain organizational decision 
making and adaptation behavior (e.g., Hammedi, Van Riel and Sasovova, 2011, Kaplan, 2008, 
Tripsas, 2009). One particularly interesting research stream in this field is the attention-based view 
(Ocasio, 1997, 2011). The attention-based view predicts that attention structures within firms, 
together with other important precursors, such as the environment and intra-organizational 
communication channels, affect the sets of “issues and answers” considered by decision makers. 
The (limited) sets of relevant issues and potential answers, in turn, affect organizational moves, and 
hence adaptation.  
 The antecedents of attention structures as determinants of organizational adaptation have 
recently started to gain scholarly attention (Eggers and Gerasymenko, 2013, Gerstner, König, 
Enders and Hambrick, 2013, Maula, et al., 2013). The values and beliefs of “players,” especially 
CEOs (Hambrick, 1994, Ocasio, 1997) who have the authority and power to influence 
organizational decision making, are essential components of the firm’s attention structure 
(Danneels, 2004). In an effort to understand the role of values and beliefs in organizational decision 
making, past research pointed to the important role of the firm founder’s imprint (Baron, Hannan 
and Burton, 1999, Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000) and has revealed that, over time, senior managers 
7 
 
develop a unique set of beliefs that is based on a shared legacy within the firm (Prahalad and Bettis, 
1986). Our study adds to these initial insights by exploring how differences in decision makers’ 
goals that are caused by variation in decision makers’ values and beliefs about the purpose of their 
firms create variance in how discontinuous technological changes are interpreted and responded to. 
We focus on CEOs as key players as they are known to possess substantial discretion to affect firm 
behavior (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990), especially when they belong to the owning family 
(Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 1999, Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2003). 
Family Businesses and Dimensions of Non-Economic Goals 
Family businesses are the dominant type of business worldwide (La Porta, Lopez De Silanes and 
Shleifer, 1999). In Germany, for instance, family businesses account for more than ninety percent of 
all firms (Gottschalk, Hauer, Niefert, Keese and Licht, 2011). In our study, we build on the work of 
Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma (1999), who refer to the owning family’s vision and commitment to 
the firm as the “essence” that renders family businesses distinguishable from other firms.  
 In a further investigation into the “essence” of family firms, Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) found 
that family firms are distinct from other forms of businesses because of their stock of 
socioemotional wealth (SEW), and their desire to keep or even increase their SEW in the future
1
. 
“Socioemotional wealth” refers to the non-economic value that individuals can derive from owning 
a firm over an extended period of time (Berrone, et al., 2012, Berrone, Cruz, Gómez-Mejía and 
Larraza-Kintana, 2010, Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2011, Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007). As such, research on 
SEW corresponds to studies that have long emphasized the importance of non-economic goals in 
family firms (Chrisman, et al., 2012, Chrisman, Chua and Sharma, 2005, Corbetta and Salvato, 
2004, Sharma, 2004). These non-economic goals co-exist with economic goals, such as achieving 
certain profitability, where the latter set of goals has received ample attention (cf. Greve, 2008).  
                                                        
1 Other attempts to categorize family firm behavior are, for instance, Miller and Le Breton-Miller’s (2005) 4C-
framework or Carney’s 3P model (Carney, M. 2005. Corporate Governance and Competitive Advantage in Family-
Controlled Firms. Entrepreneurship Theory & Practice 29(3): 249-265. ) In this study, we decided to build on SEW 
dimensions as categorization, because this allows us to capture the goals of the family CEOs in the best way. 
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 Consistent with research on SEW, the non-economic goals of family firm owners can be 
categorized along five dimensions (Berrone, et al., 2012, Gómez-Mejía, et al., 2011). First, family 
members desire to exert power and control over the company and its strategic decision making 
(Carney, 2005, Chua, et al., 1999). In fact, scholars argue that family members often strive to 
influence not only their firm but entire social ecosystems, such as industries and communities 
(Corbetta and Salvato, 2004, Tagiuri and Davis, 1996). Second, family members aim to maintain 
transgenerational value by keeping the business within the family over several generations (Chua, 
et al., 1999, Zellweger, Kellermanns, Chrisman and Chua, 2012). In this regard, extant research on 
family firms emphasizes that owners of family firms tend to strive for intra-family succession in 
order to ensure that the firm remains infused with family values (Berrone, et al., 2012, Sirmon and 
Hitt, 2003). Third, family members aim to protect the family’s reputation in society (Berrone, et al., 
2012). As members of owning families typically identify with their businesses (Zellweger, 
Eddleston and Kellermanns, 2010), they feel that the firm’s reputation reflects onto themselves 
(Berrone, et al., 2010). They therefore become sensitive about the firm’s external image (Micelotta 
and Raynard, 2011). Fourth, family members aim to preserve close and enduring ties within and 
around their firm (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005). Family firms often place great emphasis on 
demonstrating solidarity with their employees (Uzzi, 1997) and on creating relational trust 
(Coleman, 1988) with non-family constituents, such as customers (Miller, Lee, Chang and Le 
Breton-Miller, 2009). Finally, members of family firms typically enjoy emotions and affect 
associated with the family firm (Berrone, et al., 2012). In other words, they often feel emotionally 
attached to their firm, its history, and its products (Tagiuri and Davis, 1996).  
 Non-economic goals have been shown to affect various strategic outcomes, such as 
investments in environmental protection (Berrone, et al., 2010) and family firms’ innovation 
behavior (De Massis, et al., 2013). For instance, Chrisman and Patel (2012) empirically show how 
the existence of SEW influences the family firms’ reference points and thereby affects their R&D 
spending. König et al. (2013) argue that the family firm’s focus on command, continuity, 
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community, and connections (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005) can constrain the resources and 
capabilities available in the family firm and, ultimately, lead to inertia. More specifically, those 
authors argue that family firms invest less intensively, less flexibly, yet more persistently into the 
adoption of discontinuous technologies, as compared to their non-family counterpart (König, et al., 
2013). However, those authors do not address heterogeneity among family firms. Moreover, most 
extant studies on non-economic goals have aimed to directly link non-economic goals to 
organizational behavior without exploring important linkages with attention and sensemaking. 
METHODOLOGY 
Research Design and Setting  
Given the limited extant knowledge about how and why non-economic goals affect adaptation 
processes, we applied an inductive, case-based approach (Yin, 1994) in order to build mid-range 
theory (Merton, 1968). This research design is particularly appropriate for our study, as we aim to 
shed light on sensemaking, which we define in our context as the process of recognizing and 
interpreting changes in the environment, resulting in a decision of whether and how to react (Gioia 
and Chittipeddi, 1991, Thomas, Clark and Gioia, 1993). Moreover a qualitative research design is 
applicable as we aim to answer questions of “how” and “why” rather than “what” or “how many” 
(Yin, 1994).   
Our research setting is the German consumer goods sector, a mature industry that has recently 
been challenged by digitization through the rapid development of (Internet-based) software and 
hardware technologies. This digitization represents a wide-ranging and important discontinuous 
change, and it has brought about two important technological paradigm shifts
2
 (e.g., Christensen 
and Raynor, 2003, Danneels, 2004, Gilbert, 2005, Jelassi and Enders, 2008). First, consumer 
products have increasingly been enhanced with electronic features. Second, online business models 
and e-commerce portals have started to replace traditional shops and, in some cases, even 
                                                        
2These changes rendered previous core competencies, such as deep knowledge of physical store setups and localized services, obsolete and replaced 
them with a need for new capabilities. With regard to retailing, firms had to learn how to promote their shops online, adopt dynamic pricing, and 
instantly react to online customer queries. With regard to production, companies had to use new materials, such as software and hardware, in order to 
manufacture electronically enhanced products, which required them to acquire new IT skills. Moreover, firms had to adapt to the significantly shorter 
lifecycle of electronic products. 
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disintermediated the value chain. In the early phases of this technology cycle, which lasted until the 
mid-2000s in Germany and which constitute the main focus of this paper, only technology-
interested customers valued digitized products and sales channels. By the time of writing this study 
(2013), the new technology had become mainstream in most sectors. In fact, turnover in the German 
online retail segment was expected to reach EUR 29.5 billion in 2012, which represents a 13% 
increase from 2011 (Deutscher Handelsverband, 2013).  
Our setting provides a unique context for the study of family firms’ responses to 
discontinuous technological changes because the emergence of digitization is sufficiently distant in 
time to enable us to observe longitudinal response patterns but recent enough to minimize the 
retrospective bias. Moreover, family firms represent a crucial cornerstone of the focal industry. As 
suggested in the literature (Eisenhardt, 1989, Glaser and Strauss, 1967), we build on a theoretical 
sample of seven established businesses in the German consumer goods sector that vary in terms of 
size, age, and reaction to the discontinuous technological change. Appropriate firms were identified 
using information available on the Internet and data provided by industry associations. All seven 
family businesses were led by a family CEO of at least the second generation throughout the 
emergence of the discontinuous technology. Each company was fully owned by one family, which 
significantly influenced the organization’s culture and values. All interviewees confirmed that they 
viewed their businesses as “family firms.” The final sample of firms is shown in Table 1.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 around here 
----------------------------------- 
Data Collection  
The challenge of our research setting was obtaining reliable, longitudinal data that captured not only 
hard facts regarding the family firms’ implementation activities but also reflections of the family 
CEOs’ latent sensemaking with regard to the discontinuous technological change. To overcome this 
challenge, we relied on two main data sources: personal interviews (mainly undertaken in 2010) and 
the historic websites (from the mid-1990s to 2012) of the respective firms (see Table 1).  
Our analysis of the firms’ historic websites helped us to overcome the retrospective bias that 
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often challenges studies, especially studies of privately owned firms. Information gathered from 
websites provided empirical evidence of when and how firms launched their first products based on 
the new technology and, in some cases, information on how they interpreted the ongoing 
developments in the industry. In order to retrieve this data, we used “Waybackmachine”3 to 
systematically access the websites of each company in at least two-year steps (from 1996 to 2012). 
We browsed through all of the websites’ contents (including sub-sites), with a particular focus on 
sections such as “About Us,” “Our Products and Services,” “News,” and “Press Releases.”  
In addition, we collected interview data in order to gather information on the sensemaking of 
the family CEOs and to better understand the details of the firms’ adaptation processes. We 
conducted 28 open-ended, mostly in-person interviews with CEOs, employees, and industry experts 
based on semi-structured templates
4
. Each interview lasted from 30 minutes (employees) to 150 
minutes (CEOs, close advisors, and industry experts). As suggested in the extant literature (e.g., 
Bechhofer, Elliott and McCrone, 1984), the interviews were conducted by two interviewers,
5
 audio 
recorded, and transcribed verbatim shortly after the interview.  
Most important were the interviews with the family CEOs and/or their close advisors. These 
interviews revealed the CEOs’ attention to specific non-economic goals, as well as their 
sensemaking processes, which resulted in decisions whether and how to adopt the discontinuous 
technology. Such data is difficult to gather in any other way. Additional interviews with employees 
aimed to triangulate statements made by the CEOs regarding organizational routines and family 
influence, whereas interviews with industry experts enhanced our understanding of industry norms.  
In addition to the two main data sources, we used other data sources to triangulate our findings such 
as secondary data (e.g., company brochures, books, catalogs, and press articles from a 15-year 
timeframe) and observations (e.g., store or company visits). 
Data Analysis 
In line with Eisenhardt’s (1989) eight-step process for building theory based on cases, we iteratively 
                                                        
3 A free service offered by Internet Archive (http://www.archive.org). 
4 Additional information on the data collection and data analysis process of this study can be found in the supplementary online Appendix.  
5 The only exception was interviews with employees, which were conducted by phone with only one interviewer. 
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engaged in the data gathering and analysis process, thereby integrating a variance and a process 
perspective (Langley, 1999). First, for each company, we summarized the findings of the data-
collection process into a case study that described the respective company, its key stakeholders, the 
CEO’s sensemaking, and the firm’s adaptation process over time. Based on empirical evidence 
(“first-order data”) from these case studies, we engaged in a data-reduction process (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) to distill higher-order constructs, which we later linked to the extant literature. 
 In a subsequent step, we conducted a cross-case analysis, searching for common patterns 
among the cases. To do so, we created an initial coding scheme for the higher-order constructs 
identified in the first step based on extant research on family businesses as well as literature on 
organizational adaptation. We then coded the textual material while iteratively refining the coding 
schemes. We used the computer programs NVivo and Excel to organize our data and to code the 
interviews. In line with best practices in case-study research (Bechhofer, et al., 1984, van Maanen, 
1979), our coding and analysis process was undertaken by multiple coders who independently 
coded and interpreted the data. After gathering the independent perspectives of the individual 
coders, we examined the independent findings, triangulated them with additional secondary data 
when available, and discussed any remaining discrepancies until consensus was reached. Graphical 
illustrations of the findings and Excel-based overview charts were particularly useful in our 
evaluation process. We presented preliminary results to experts and interviewees and used their 
feedback to make refinements to the individual cases and the model (Flick, 2009). 
RESULTS 
In line with predictions found in theory on family business (Berrone, et al., 2012, Gomez-Mejia, et 
al., 2007), our results indicate that our case-study family CEOs possessed high levels of 
socioemotional endowment, which they aimed to maintain and/or enhance. Furthermore, qualitative 
coding and frequency counts reveal that the family CEOs referred to non-economic goals more 
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often than economic goals during the interviews
6
. The total counts and the proportion of references 
to economic versus non-economic goals were relatively stable among the cases. However, the 
specific non-economic goals that the family CEOs pursued varied substantially among the firms.  
In the following, we introduce the process model of family firm adaptation to discontinuous 
technological change that we induced from our case-based evidence.  
An Attention-Based Model of Family-Firm Adaptation to Discontinuous Technologies 
The overarching model that we induced from our data is visualized in Figure 1. This model builds 
on the attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997) to explain how the non-economic goals of family firm 
CEOs shape the sensemaking of these players and, in turn, the organizational responses of the 
respective firms to discontinuous technological changes. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 around here 
------------------------------------ 
The process begins with the emergence of a discontinuous technology (in our specific case: 
digitization), which is introduced by industry-external firms (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003) and thus 
can be classified as a stimulus that is external to the entire industry. After recognizing the 
discontinuous technological change, the family CEO makes sense of it. In a first stage he or she 
determines whether the discontinuous technology is perceived as relevant or irrelevant (Christensen 
and Bower, 1996), and whether it requires instant action (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000, Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986). The family CEO’s initial interpretation of this discontinuous technology is 
thereby shaped by the CEO’s goals, especially his or her attention to non-economic aims (arrow a).  
 The outcome of this initial assessment of the new technology affects what the CEO considers 
as viable options for initial organizational response (arrow b). If several non-economic goals (or 
different aspects of one non-economic goal) lead to diverging interpretations of the issue, ambiguity 
regarding the trend’s relevance arises. This, in turn, makes the CEO uncertain about how to best 
respond to the discontinuous change (arrow c). In addition, the CEO’s non-economic goals can 
                                                        
6 This is particularly the case for the early phase of technology emergence (roughly until mid-2000s in our context). In this early phase, economic 
incentives to invest in digitization were low, particularly for profitable and well-established firms active in the traditional consumer goods sector.  
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either restrict his or her set of possible responses or liberate the CEO from economic constraints 
associated with organizational moves (arrow d). In certain circumstances a dilemma arises that 
slows down the entire sensemaking process (arrow e). This is the case if a family CEO who 
interprets the discontinuous technological change as highly relevant can only choose from a limited 
set of possible responses (because of the limits imposed by his or her non-economic goals) when 
addressing the issue (cf. König, et al., 2013). The sensemaking process ends with the family CEO’s 
initial decision whether and how to respond to the discontinuous technological change (arrow f).  
Over time, the CEO re-engages in the sensemaking process. This is necessary as the further 
technological development and the initial organizational moves affect the family CEO’s economic 
and non-economic endowments, which might prompt the CEO to re-prioritize the goals. Such re-
engagement in the sensemaking process might lead to changes in the adaptation pattern (arrow g).  
Individual Case Studies 
In the following, we describe our seven case studies, which we ordered along the five non-
economic goals introduced in the theoretical overview. We provide evidence of the respective 
family CEOs’ interpretation of and the firms’ reactions to digitization (first level data), which we 
gathered from multiple sources. We also link the cases to the various second- and higher order 
constructs covered by our model. 
 Anything & More
7—Attention on the family’s power and control. Anything & More is a 
large organization that is fully owned by the second generation of the founding family. As we 
synthesized from interview statements, Jake, the family CEO, is particularly inclined to maintain 
the family’s power within and outside of the firm as the following evidence illustrates. The focus on 
family control within the firm is, for instance, reflected in the family CEO’s leadership motto:  
We know the business. Our father built the business. …—we define the direction we will take. 
 
Evidence of this focus is also found in a historical anecdote. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, the firm’s founder had to sell shares to outside investors, i.e., another family. This move 
                                                        
7 All names of firms and individuals have been changed to ensure confidentiality. Unless otherwise indicated, the information presented in these case 
studies stems from our analysis of interview material. 
15 
 
“made the family CEO very unhappy,” according to those close to the family. After more than two 
decades, Jake succeeded in buying back those shares. In so doing, he secured the family’s power 
within the firm. Today, the family “categorically refuses to consider any possibility of going 
public,” according to a close advisor of the family CEO.  
 However, the CEO’s attention on power and control is not restricted to the firm itself as the 
following evidence shows. A commemorative publication from 2009 described the family members 
as individuals who aimed to “leave a distinct, unmistakable mark on the German economy.” The 
same brochure described both the founder and his son, Jake, as being characterized by 
“stubbornness, … willpower, … and the desire to assume responsibility”—A description that can be 
associated with the goal to exert power and control.  
 Jake’s goal of exerting power and control also affects strategic decision making within the 
firm, as the following evidence shows. Although Anything & More is a large company with a top-
management team that formally has the power to jointly decide on strategic actions, all proposals 
for strategic activities must be discussed with and approved by Jake. This requirement makes Jake 
the de facto sole decision maker. A close advisor of the family CEO stated in the interview:  
Before a proposal is discussed at a board meeting, the initiators of the proposal go to the CEO and say: “At the 
next board meeting, we would like to discuss the following topic.” The CEO then has a look and responds: … 
“That is good. I like it.” or “No, I do not like it. We should do it differently.” … In the latter case, the topic is 
removed from the agenda. One must rework the concept until the CEO likes it. However, once the CEO says 
“Yes, I like it,” the board meeting takes place in the following way. One introduces the concept during the board 
meeting. … Then it becomes dead silent in the room, so that you can hear the rustling of the air conditioner. 
After this pause, the CEO says “I believe it is a good idea. We should follow your proposal.” Subsequently, the 
voices [of top-management team members] are heard saying “Yes, I think so, too.” Ultimately, the board’s 
decision is unanimous. 
Stage one and two: Initial interpretation of the issue and considered responses. According to our 
interviews, Jake recognized the emergence of digitization as a new technology when the American 
trend was first discussed in German newspapers in the mid-1990s. Press articles of that time and 
interview statements reveal that Jake perceived the new technology as an “opportunity [to enlarge 
the family’s] empire” and thus apparently as a useful means to increase his family’s power over the 
German market. Jake’s positive attitude towards digitization and the timeliness of his assessment of 
digitized services as relevant for his business are noteworthy, because investments in digitization 
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were initially perceived as unprofitable within the German market. For instance, German journalists 
assessed the chances of the new technology to turn out successful as uncertain, and they foresaw 
profound challenges in adopting the new technology, as articles in renowned magazines such as 
Spiegel in 2000 reveal. In fact, at that time, Jake had a somewhat conservative outlook on the likely 
amount of revenues that could be derived from digitization within the next decade, as he stated in 
several media interviews. He envisaged digitization as a powerful “accessory [that would, 
however,] never have the potential to replace traditional business.” In other words, economic 
considerations fail to convincingly explain Jake’s positive attitude towards digitization at the time.  
The set of strategic options that Jake considered after he assessed the new technology as an 
important and urgent issue was relatively unconstrained, as shown by interview quotes such as: 
We had a pragmatic view and said: “The Internet is something new and we have to offer an online shop now. … 
Maybe there will be concepts that differ from today’s core concepts. [When considering this new business area, 
there was] a substantial amount of imagination among us.  
This pragmatic view of how to pursue the e-commerce business indicates that Jake’s set of potential 
responses to the discontinuous technological change was relatively unconstrained by any economic 
or non-economic considerations. This apparent lack of restrictions was confirmed by one of the 
managing directors, who stated in a 2009 press interview that Anything & More’s core business 
“would remain [only] as long as it was useful.”  
 Stage three: Initial organizational moves. The outcome of Jake’s sensemaking process, that 
is, the perception of digitization as relevant, urgent issue that needed to be responded to with any 
possible move, facilitated quick and fundamental organizational changes as analyses of web 
archives and interviews show. From the very beginning, Anything & More invested substantial 
resources in the commercialization of the new business, as a manager described: 
We started proactively by setting up a completely new division, which we called “New Media.” We hired 
[Andy] as the director and gave him a substantial budget that allowed him to make bold moves. … Moreover, we 
brought in Dr. [Endres] … from a successful player in the field of digitization. He had the task of building up our 
e-commerce solution, as we said: “Okay, we really have to tackle this now.” 
Anything & More’s initial adoption activities included the launch of a series of online shops 
beginning in 1994, but these shops failed due to a lack of customer interest. These failures did not 
demotivate the family CEO, who viewed the setbacks as “steps toward gaining experience in e-
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commerce.” Apparently, the family CEO’s focus on power and influence freed him from economic 
constraints, such as required profitability. Therefore, the company continued investing, although 
“most projects ended up in the Internet’s chamber of horror,” as one interviewee stated. Over time, 
according to our interviews, the firm built up comprehensive knowledge and capabilities within the 
new domain by, for instance, hiring managers and employees who were experienced in e-
commerce, and by acquiring external knowledge through new ventures.  
 Stage four: Temporal development. Over a span of two decades, Anything & More 
persistently showed high levels of innovativeness based on the new technology as press releases and 
website statements reveal. It established a venture-capital organization to invest in promising 
Internet start-ups. It was the first German player in this market to offer native e-commerce services, 
and it experimented with online shopping through mobile devices as early as 2002 (according to 
press releases and interview statements). This continuous stream of investments indicates that 
Anything & More did not experience a fundamental re-evaluation phase. Instead, it maintained its 
initial decision to profoundly invest in digitization. Interview statements and press material indicate 
that the non-economic goal of preserving power and control was reinforced by economic 
considerations as the new technology advanced in maturity, because at that time, Jake began to 
perceive digitization as an “increasingly important strategic determinant of success,” according to a 
press interview at the turn of the century.  
 King’s Goods—Attention on transgenerational values. King’s Goods is a large family firm 
that has been owned and managed by members of a single family since its foundation almost 150 
years ago. It is led by George, the family CEO. Although the company is similar in size to Anything 
& More and active in similar segments, George’s most salient non-economic goal is different. As he 
discussed in an informal conversation with another family business owner in 2013, George is most 
conscious of “being able to transfer the business to [his] children—regardless of the size of that 
business.” Although this goal assumes that the business will remain financially viable over time, it 
is likely to be distinct from pure attention on economic factors and from the non-economic goal of 
18 
 
familial power, mostly because this goal engenders a prolonged time horizon. Instead of 
considering what is good for the business today, George’s attention is centered on what would be 
good for the business in 30 years, as stated in a press article in 2010. According to our interview 
with George, this attention on transgenerational values is rooted in the company’s heritage and was 
included in the family constitution. In our interview, George explained that these transgenerational 
values had been “implanted” in him in his childhood when he joined his father on business trips.  
 Stage one and two: Initial interpretation of the issue and considered responses. The 
attention on the next generation affected how the CEO interpreted the emergence of digitization. 
Similar to Anything & More’s CEO, George recognized the upcoming trend when he read 
newspaper articles in the early 1990s, according to the interview. However, he began to better 
understand the importance of the trend when interacting with his children:  
I have kids and, of course, they possess all the gadgets that have come onto the market in recent years. … At 
first, I thought “This is just a temporary trend.” … But then I realized that this generation uses technology to 
differentiate itself from previous generations … [and that the new technology] would not disappear. … I could 
have continued for another ten years [without adoption] and afterwards handed over the business to the next 
generation. But then, in 10 to 20 years, my children, or my nephews and nieces would have said to me: “Didn’t 
you realize that something was happening? Why didn’t you react?” 
Apparently, George feared that a non-reaction would jeopardize the sustainability of the firm. Thus, 
the focus on transgenerational value led him to assess the technology as a relevant challenge to 
which the firm needed to respond. However, while George interpreted the trend as important, he did 
not feel the need to engage in instant and profound investment activities. Rather, he intended to:  
… keep my options open [because e-commerce is] a fascinating world, which is not easy at all; a world that is 
highly transparent, incredibly fast, and direct. … When this world arrives, I want my family business to take 
part. 
When thinking of possible ways to “take part” in this new world, George, similar to Jake, did not 
place any restrictions on the adoption approach as long as it enabled him to transfer the business to 
his children, as the following interview quote illustrates: 
[Activities that would put the transfer to the next generation at risk] are out of question. We would rather do less 
but do it sustainably. 
This broad view on potential business activities was also evident in the firm’s previous activities, 
which had not been subject to any boundaries in terms of geography, or products and services.  
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 Stage three: Initial organizational moves. As George comprehended the importance of the 
discontinuous technological change for himself and his family firm long before it was economically 
viable (see discussion in respective paragraphs of Anything & More), King’s Goods undertook its 
first experiments with digitization as early as 1997 (according to archival websites, press releases, 
and interviews). Those early attempts, which included the introduction of online ordering and home-
delivery services in selected regions, were carried out in cooperation with external partners (archival 
websites). Moreover, these investments were characterized as having a “life in the shadows” (CEO, 
interview) rather than as bold moves. In fact, the first fully functional Internet shop was not launched 
until 2001. George reflected on those early activities:  
We were too fainthearted—not revolutionary enough. [We ran the shop] as an add-on [only. …] But I had the 
feeling that something was going on and that we had to stay attuned to it. … I may have made one of my better 
decisions, if I may say so myself, because I did not sell the online shop to [one of our competitors] when I sold 
the division [to which the online shop belonged]. Instead, I said to myself: “You should keep the online store for 
now.”  
Stage four: Temporal development. As the technology moved into the mainstream in the mid-
2000s, economic interests increased and seemingly also affected George’s sensemaking. He 
subsequently evaluated digitization as an increasingly pressing issue and felt that his firm “had to 
speed up” its reaction to the technological change (according to interview statements). As expressed 
in the interview and triangulated with archival web data and annual reports, King’s Good 
subsequently ramped up investments, established a new division, hired external managers, started to 
co-invest in Internet startups, and launched an additional online shop in 2003 together with a 
partner. From 2006 to 2009, the number of employees working on digitization doubled (according 
to annual reports). Despite the intensity of these responses, experts assess the adaptation moves of 
King’s Goods as mimicry of existing business models and as investments in external ventures rather 
than signs of internal innovation. 
Power Star—Attention on family reputation. Power Star is a medium-sized firm owned by 
its founding family. The family CEO Tim is particularly attentive to maintaining his family’s 
reputation in society as a value-driven family renowned for a focus on social responsibility, quality 
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assurance, and innovation as the following evidence reveals. In the interview, Tim particularly 
stressed the social responsibility of his family as he stated that:  
I am liable here. I have a social responsibility! [In other words,] I have not only a financial responsibility but also 
a social responsibility. 
Related to this perceived social responsibility is Tim’s desire to be known to provide excellent and 
innovative products and services to his customers. This is, for instance, reflected in the wealth of 
“excellence” certificates and quality awards shown on Power Star’s websites (archival and current), 
which indicate that the family pays a significant amount of attention to conveying an honorable and 
reliable image to customers. Moreover, according to Tim, Power Star invested in building up a 
larger-than-financially-reasonable R&D department in order to provide novel products in the best 
achievable quality. Although initiatives that improve product quality might at first sight be assessed 
as part of an (economically motivated) premium supplier strategy, Power Star’s investments in such 
initiatives and certificates exceeded what would be rational from an economic standpoint. For 
instance, in 2012, Power Star invested more than one million EUR into launching a permanent, 
regional exhibition about the family firm and an associated illustrated book about the family firm’s 
history (according to press articles). Tim explained in an interview with local media: “We did not 
invest into those activities in order to earn money.”  
Stage one and two: Initial interpretation of the issue and considered responses. As Tim 
explained in the interview, he frequently visited trade fairs to quickly become aware of and get 
inspired by new trends and ideas that started to emerge. As such, he recognized the ongoing 
technological changes in the environments in the mid-1990s (according to our interview and 
triangulated by press releases). Since he interpreted the issue as urgent and relevant—“at that time 
people started talking about digitization everywhere,” as he described in our interview—he set up a 
multidisciplinary team of employees that subsequently met on a regular basis to discuss how to 
integrate the discontinuous technology into Power Star’s portfolio of offered products and services. 
Given Power Star’s focus on “being modern” (interview with CEO), non-adoption would have most 
likely challenged his family’s reputation as an innovative player.  
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However, as with most discontinuous technologies, digitization was also widely associated 
with some quality challenges at that time (e.g., delayed deliveries of online-ordered Christmas 
presents in 1999 in Germany or the poor experience associated with early e-books). These 
challenges stood in opposition to Power Star’s focus on quality, as explained by Tim in the 
interview: “We wanted to offer only digitized products of highest quality standards.” Accordingly, 
Tim’s set of potential responses to this issue was restricted. For instance, as explained in the 
interview, he only considered products that could be developed in-house in order to ensure that 
management could monitor all processes and that any potential moves would be prepared carefully 
in order to secure the quality of his products and services (and thus the family’s reputation). Along 
these lines, the CEO explained:   
[We aimed to] thoroughly assess the [potential] concepts [because the new technology] was something 
completely new to us [and] something fairly complex. … In such circumstances, there is a lot to take into 
account. You have to test so much—it is incredible. … The only way that we can go into such a situation is to 
prepare everything very carefully. It does not matter whether this takes a bit longer. We will save the time 
afterwards. Preparation is a highly essential element. 
Although Power Star’s capabilities regarding the implementation and commercialization of the new 
technology might be assessed as (at least) comparable to those of Anything & More and King’s 
Goods from the outsider’s perspective, the latter two companies adopted a trial-and-error mode 
rather than contemplating potential challenges related to the technology’s adoption in advance. 
According to Tim, the firm’s internal preparation phase lasted from the mid-1990s until 2001, when 
the family CEO, after ample testing and training, was finally convinced that the firm could offer 
digitized products and services at the desired level of quality and the development phase began. 
Stage three: Initial organizational moves. In order to implement this response, Power Star 
had to make significant upfront investments. Accordingly, the development of digitized products 
and services started in 2001 and they were made available to customers in 2004 (archival websites, 
firm chronicle). In order to mitigate the risk of quality issues that could harm the family’s 
reputation, all development was carried out in-house. For that purpose, a new department was 
created, externals were hired, and employees were trained (interview). The CEO explained: 
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We hired [digitalization specialists] from outside the company. We built an entire department from scratch. We 
need these employees a lot now … and we need a lot of technical equipment to be able to do these things. There 
is so much more to it. 
Stage four: Temporal development. After the launch of its first electronic products and services, 
Power Star continually refined its digitized portfolio (according to several press notes). However, 
customer feedback and news reports indicate that the firm did not have to revise its strategy because 
the new products and services successfully met quality demands. Although the company adopted 
the existing technology instead of inventing fundamentally new solutions, the firm improved the 
quality and reliability of products and services in the new domain (according to archival websites 
and press releases). Such activities could be categorized as incremental innovations in the new 
domain.
8
 Given this apparently satisfactory outcome of his firm’s response to the discontinuous 
technological change, Tim seemed to have no reason to alter his adaptation strategy, which might 
explain the firm’s so far stable adaptation pattern.  
Retail 2000—Attention on enduring ties. Retail 2000 is a large family-owned and family-
managed firm that was founded almost 200 years ago. Since its foundation, the family has spent a 
significant amount of effort and time on building up and maintaining good relationships with its 
stakeholders, especially customers and employees (according to interview statements, press 
releases, and statements on the firm’s current and archival websites). For instance, the 
announcement indicating the establishment of the firm, which was released in the early nineteenth 
century, emphasized Retail 2000’s focus on employee satisfaction and wellbeing. The most recent 
version of the website highlights “customer orientation […and] employees” as main pillars. 
 While fostering ties with important stakeholders can also be a defining element of an 
economically driven strategy (for instance, due to expected benefits from customer loyalty), Retail 
2000’s focus on maintaining those ties seems to go beyond what is financially beneficial. For 
example, a few decades ago, Retail 2000’s CEO had the financially attractive opportunity to 
substantially enlarge the business by opening the first large discount store in the region. As 
Michael, the family CEO, explained, his father, who was CEO at the time, initially decided against 
                                                        
8 At the time when Power Star started to implement the new technology, digitization was already established enough to allow for incremental 
innovation based on existing products and services.  
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taking the economically attractive offer, as he feared that such a store would disrupt the region’s 
infrastructure and harm the family’s personal relationships with suppliers and local competitors. 
Furthermore, in 2012, Retail 2000 still offered selected, economically unprofitable products in its 
portfolio that were only desired by several long-standing niche customers. As Michael explained:  
We also stock items that only a few customers buy. However, we know that these products are important for 
those customers because they cannot get them anywhere else. 
 
This statement shows that Michael is particularly attentive to the needs of loyal customers. It also 
suggests that his primary rationale for offering such products is to preserve his family firm’s ties to 
the company’s long-term customers. 
 Stage one and two: Initial interpretation of the issue and considered responses. Michael 
first encountered the upcoming technology in newspaper articles at the end of the 1990s, according 
to the interview. As Michael was mainly focused on his (local) network of established ties, he 
initially assessed the new technology as having little relevance for his own business as the 
following quote illustrates: 
We viewed pure e-commerce—by that, we mean selling things online and delivering them to the customers—as 
peripheral. … Retail is a local business. 
Michael’s interpretation of the issue as having little relevance differs from those evaluations made 
in the above-described family firms and instead is likely to resemble the perception of a CEO purely 
driven by economic goals. Given Michael’s interpretation of the new technology as largely 
irrelevant, all considered responses were naturally related to strategic moves in the old domain.  
 Stage three: Initial organizational moves. Retail 2000 did not adopt digitization during its 
phase of emergence. Instead, it invested in established markets (with established suppliers and loyal 
customers). From the beginning of the late 1990s, Retail 2000 invested in opening new stores in 
selected regions, to which family members or trusted employees were personally attached 
(according to interview statements and archival websites). It also expanded its product portfolio to 
include goods from local suppliers who were also part of the family’s network. In general, the aim 
in this regard was to improve the customer’s experience, according to the interview. Many of those 
activities could be labeled as incremental innovations in the old domain. 
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 Stage four: Temporal development. As the technology developed further, Michael began to 
realize its importance, most likely because he began to view it as a threat to his transgenerational 
intentions, as described below. In the interview, which took place in 2011, the CEO stated that his 
assessment of the technology had changed within the last years: 
It is obvious that e-commerce is an important field today. We do not need any consultative study to tell us that. If 
you read a newspaper or look at the Internet, you can easily see that. [… However,] we have not seen a way to 
get there yet. [We thus require] new ideas. … [We feel torn between] being loyal to [existing, local] customers 
and thereby hazarding our sustainability [or entering new markets. We need to find a long-term solution.] This 
long-term orientation includes development processes, so that we work really hard in precisely the fields we feel 
are important for us, and we make sure that we make progress in those fields. 
This re-assessment happened at a time when firms with purely economic motives were also more 
likely to have recognized the importance of the new technology. However, while large parts of the 
traditional German retailing market were already struggling to deal with the development of e-
commerce, as data from industry associations shows, Retail 2000 did not experience an immediate 
economic threat. Performance data obtained from the Orbis (Bureau van Dijk) database show 
continual sales growth from 2006
9
 to 2012. Furthermore, an investigation by a German business 
magazine reveals that Michael’s family was able to increase its wealth by several hundred million 
EUR between 2001 and 2012. This indicates that the perceived “hazard [of] sustainability”, as it 
was described by Michael, was most likely tied to the long term and to Michael’s desire to hand 
over a vital business, prepared for long-term success, to his children. The focus on this non-
economic goal of transgenerational value became more salient over the first decade of the 21
st
 
century as the entry of Michael’s son (who became a manager within the firm in 2012) approached.  
 As the statement above illustrates, Michael’s focus on local customers and his reluctance to 
implement any activities that would not be beneficial for those stakeholders constrained his set of 
available actions. Akin to Power Star’s CEO, Michael therefore faced a dilemma when he 
recognized the issue of digitization as relevant but was constrained by the limited set of possible 
responses. This dilemma was apparently resolved towards the end of 2011 when Retail 2000 
entered the e-commerce market by launching a service that combined online ordering with physical 
collection at the nearest store. This business model, which already existed on the market, 
                                                        
9 No public data on turnover is available for periods before 2006 for this firm.  
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constituted a “compromise” or “hybrid” solution. It allowed the firm to (partly) adopt the 
technology while maintaining its connections with local customers.  
 White & Blue—Attention on enduring ties. White & Blue was established in the early 
twentieth century, and it is still fully owned by the founder’s family. Today, the company is 
managed by Richard, a family CEO. Evidence from the interviews, websites, and press releases 
shows that the family CEO, similar to the owners of Retail 2000, pays close attention to maintaining 
good relationships with stakeholders, especially employees and customers. This is not only mirrored 
in the company’s mission to “provide home” for customers and employees, but also in the large 
number of events organized by the owning family for employees.  
 Stage one and two: Initial interpretation of the issue and considered responses. Similar to 
Retail 2000’s CEO, Richard first assessed the emerging technology as irrelevant for his firm.10  
I assumed there was no [disruptive change]. I also believe in evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
developments: “Retail is Detail.” 
Presumably, the upcoming trend did not affect any of his focal goals in its early stages of 
development. However, some long-tenured employees assessed the trend as important and 
consequently approached the CEO with their ideas for adoption, as Richard explained in the 
interview. Given the family CEO’s focus on trust and self-determination among employees, Richard 
seemingly felt torn between his own perceptions of digitization and those of his trusted employees 
and felt ambiguity in how to finally assess the relevance of the new technology. Ultimately, as 
explained in the interview, he targeted for a “hybrid” strategy that aimed to satisfy both views.  
 Any potential response to the new technology was constrained by the goal-infused boundary 
condition that service and personal relations to his customers had to remain unaffected by 
technology adoption. Richard emphasized this aspect of his most fundamental business philosophy:  
Our services must be right. … Service means being friendly and helpful and other very simple things that have 
not changed, and probably will not change for many years to come. 
As this interview quote indicates, radical e-commerce solutions that relied on computerized rather 
than human service provision were most likely not included in Richard’s set of considered 
                                                        
10 The low relevance of e-commerce is also mirrored in a 200-page firm chronicle, issued in 2008, which contains only two mentions of the term 
“Internet” (or relevant synonyms). 
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responses due to his focus on interpersonal relations with customers.  
 Stage three: Initial organizational moves. In addition to initiatives to strengthen its position 
in established markets, such as the launch of various customer-retention programs, White & Blue 
engaged in some low intensity activities in the e-commerce domain starting in 1999. For example, it 
began to offer online photo development, home delivery of flowers ordered online, and “order 
online—pick up from the nearest store” services for certain geographical areas (interviews and 
archival websites). According to the CEO and archival websites, whenever such initiatives failed, e-
commerce was quickly abandoned resulting in an “on-off” pattern of technology adoption.  
 Stage four: Temporal development. After years of ambiguity of how to interpret digitization, 
around 2010, Richard seemingly began to realize that the trend of digitization would continue:  
[E-commerce and digitization] might change a lot. … I believe or, maybe, I hope that social interactions will not 
be replaced by computers, iPhones, or iPads. … We have to think of another way [to adopt e-commerce]. 
However, we know that we cannot get away without building on the new technology. I would say that this has 
become certain over the years. I was really the one who was most hesitant, but I am very clear now: we also have 
to follow this path. 
Most likely, this re-evaluation was triggered by economic reasons. Over time, economic incentives 
to invest into the new technology had increased and according to the Orbis database, White & Blue 
faced severe economic struggles beginning in 2006. White & Blue launched a new e-commerce 
shop in mid-2011 by mimicking already existing solutions according to press releases. This online 
shop offered some of the products sold in White & Blue’s shops but not the entire product 
portfolio. Moreover, the online shop was clearly separated from the firm’s core business. For 
instance, there was no Internet link from the company’s website to the newly launched online shop 
and there were no marketing initiatives in the classic, physical stores to promote the new business. 
This “partial” move into the new domain, which did not seek to harvest all synergies between the 
domains, can be interpreted as a reflection of the CEO’s ongoing ambiguity regarding digitization.  
 Top Goods—Attention on emotions and affect. Top Goods was founded almost 200 years 
ago, and it is now led by two members of the owning family. Many interview statements indicate 
that the CEO pays close attention to maintaining the positive emotions related to the firm in the 
present. Moreover, the CEO frequently referred to words related to the firm’s legacy such as 
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“tradition,” “ancestors,” and “pre-determination.” Other, more future oriented economic and non-
economic goals appear to play subordinate roles as the analysis of interview statements revealed. 
For instance, showing no growth aspirations, John stated in the interview, “I think, in principle, we 
will always stay a small player.” John, the family CEO described his own path to becoming CEO of 
the family firm and his motivation to work for Top Goods
11
 as follows: 
From early on, my parents pushed me in the direction of becoming their successor. After an apprenticeship, I 
joined the family firm at the lowest level and had to climb up the greasy pole. … I have to conclude that I am 
happy and proud to work in this family firm. 
 Stage one and two: Initial interpretation of the issue and considered responses. As with 
White & Blue and Retail 2000, John initially assessed digitization as irrelevant for his firm.
 
The 
focus on affect, joy, and tradition as most important endowments of John, stood in sharp contrast to 
the new technology, which was downplayed as the following cite shows:  
Electronic devices are not communicative. … I thus believe that there will be room for our firm in the future—at 
least as long as computers do not start to show any emotions. … This is our right to exist. [Our products and 
services] bring relief in a digitized world. … I think we should continue working on [our traditional products and 
services]. If we are not able to do so, we should close our business. 
This attitude was also shared by his co-CEO, as a 2004 interview with media revealed. Given this 
assessment of the issue as not particularly relevant for the firm and the resulting limited scope of 
strategic action (“continue working on [our traditional products and services]”), Top Goods did not 
attempt to adopt the new technology.  
 Stage three and four: Initial organizational moves and temporal development. In the mid-
2000s, Top Goods began investing into broadening its traditional product portfolio, especially by 
focusing on premium products, addressing new customer groups, and moving into international 
markets (according to interviews and archival websites). These moves could be explained as 
reaction to economic challenges, which even threatened Top Goods’ organizational health: The 
sales volume declined by 50% between 2000 and 2012 in two of Top Goods’ core segments, 
according to archived websites. Although several of these activities were assessed as “highly 
innovative” by industry experts, none of them crossed the technological boundary.  
                                                        
11 Although he is emotionally attached to the firm and its history, John does not feel a specific attachment to the consumer goods segment. He rather 
feels attached to the tradition of the firm. In the interview, John explained that he would have wanted to become a mechanical engineer, if there was 
no family business.  
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 Peter’s Finest—Attention on emotions and affect. The case of Peter’s Finest, a medium-
sized, third-generation family firm, can be viewed as a literal replication of the Top Goods case. In 
both cases, the goals of the family CEO, and the sensemaking and adaptation process are similar. 
The CEO of Peter’s Finest quickly decided not to adopt the new technology. Peter’s Finest moved 
into a market niche to escape the need to adopt the technological change and invested in domain 
offense activities in this specific niche. Within this market niche, Peter’s Finest is now known for 
its innovativeness as the family CEO, our interviewee, proudly explained.
12
   
Cross-case Summary 
In the following, we show how our process model explains adaptation heterogeneity among family 
firms by comparing the CEOs’ sensemaking and firm behavior at each stage of the induced model 
across cases. The results of our cross-case comparison are shown in Table 2.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2 around here 
------------------------------------ 
Attention to non-economic goals. Our case-based evidence revealed that the seven family CEOs 
differed considerably with regards to their non-economic goals. Moreover, we found that each non-
economic goal affected the firms’ adaptation, particularly in the early phases of sensemaking.  
 Stage one: Issue interpretation. Synthesizing the findings of our individual cases shows that 
the CEOs’ interpretations were highly heterogeneous within our sample. Three of the seven CEOs 
interpreted the technology as relevant early on. Two of those CEOs even viewed the discontinuous 
change to be of pressing importance. In contrast, four CEOs initially felt that the emerging 
technology was irrelevant for their businesses.  
 This heterogeneity arose because the interpretation of the issue was influenced by the family 
CEOs’ specific non-economic goals (arrow a). Family CEOs appeared to interpret the emergent 
trend as relevant from the very beginning—and even earlier than one might expect them to do if they 
                                                        
12 Additional information on this case can be obtained from the authors. 
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had followed purely economic goals
13—if the new technology was assessed as useful for achieving 
their non-economic goals. This was the case for the goal of exerting “power and control” (Anything 
& More) because the CEO hoped to find ways of further influencing the industry and increasing his 
family’s power. Family CEOs with goals of creating “transgenerational value” (King’s Goods) or 
being renowned as owners of innovative, high-quality firms (Power Star) interpreted the new 
technology as relevant because they feared that non-adoption would jeopardize their non-economic 
goals. In contrast, family CEOs initially assessed the technology as irrelevant if their non-economic 
goals were “unaffected” by the new technology, that is, if adoption of the new technology would not 
help to achieve non-economic goals, nor would non-adoption put those goals directly at risk. The 
CEOs who paid most attention to protecting “enduring ties” with stakeholders (Retail 2000, White & 
Blue) and those CEOs focused on the family’s “emotions and affect” (Top Goods, Peter’s Finest) 
concentrated on trends and issues within the old domain. This outcome is similar to the sensemaking 
predicted for purely economically driven firms at early stages of technology evolution (when the 
technology is likely to be considered unprofitable). We also observed that one CEO who focused on 
“enduring ties” (White & Blue) was confronted with ambiguity about how to assess the new 
technology: his own assessment of digitization as irrelevant to achieve the non-economic goal of 
“binding ties” was incompatible with his trusted employees’ assessment of digitization as relevant. 
As the CEO typically paid great attention to the opinion of trusted employees (due to the goal of 
“binding ties”), he was uncertain how to treat the issue and his interpretation of the relevance of the 
technology was unstable over time (arrow c).  
 Stage two: The set of considered responses. As the CEOs’ interpretations of the issue affect 
their sets of considered answers (Ocasio, 1997), we also observed heterogeneity in the CEOs’ 
contemplations of how to respond to the new technology (arrow b). However, the breadth and range 
of adaptation options varied not only because the interpretations of the issue differed but also 
because CEOs were dissimilarly constrained or liberated by their non-economic goals (arrow d). 
                                                        
13 Standard literature on discontinuous technologies predicts that firms will only start to assess a new technology as relevant when the masses become 
interested in that technology. 
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Among the three firms that immediately perceived the issue as important, the goals of exerting 
“power and control” (Anything & More) and maintaining “transgenerational value” (King’s Goods) 
resulted in largely unconstrained sets of responses. Response options were perceived as valuable as 
long as they were considered useful for achieving the non-economic goals. Thus, a focus on these 
particular non-economic goals even allowed for more freedom than would be expected if the firm 
were purely driven by economic factors (and therefore largely constricted to financially profitable 
projects and restricted from engaging in years of “trial and error”).  
 In contrast, the CEO who focused on the “family’s reputation” (Power Star) was largely 
restricted in his set of potential responses, as any possible response needed to fulfill certain criteria 
(e.g., high levels of quality, no error policy) that stemmed from this specific goal. Consequently, 
while the non-economic goal of maintaining the family’s reputation motivated the CEO to adopt the 
new technology (see stage 1), it also restricted his set of possible responses, causing a dilemma that 
prolonged the firm’s sensemaking and preparation phase (arrow e). The set of responses considered 
by CEOs who focused on “enduring ties” was also highly constrained (White & Blue, Retail 2000 in 
later phases), as this goal centered on fulfilling the needs of long-term customers and other 
stakeholders, and thus inhibited activities that would negatively affect these stakeholders. The two 
companies focused on “emotions and affect” (Top Goods, Peter’s Finest) did not view the 
technology as relevant throughout our investigation. However, statements made by these CEOs 
during the interviews indicated that any strategic move by the firm was substantially constrained by 
their desire to maintain the status quo, and by their reverence of the company’s history.  
 Stage three: Initial organizational moves. As a result of the substantial variance among family 
firms in their CEOs’ sensemaking, the initial organizational moves were largely heterogeneous 
(arrow f). All three firms that initially viewed the issue as relevant engaged in some distinct form of 
domain creation (Ford and Baucus, 1987). In the case characterized by a perception of urgency 
combined with an unconstrained set of responses (Anything & More), the resulting response pattern 
was a highly intense and flexible adoption of the new technology, which resulted in high levels of 
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innovation in the new domain. Thus, the focus on “power and control” lead to an adoption that was 
earlier, more intensive, and more flexible than if the firm was purely driven by economic goals. In 
the case in which the issue was interpreted as relevant but not urgent (King’s Goods), early moves to 
adopt the new technology were characterized by low intensity and could be assessed as mimicry in 
the new domain. The family CEO that assessed the issue as relevant and pressing yet was restricted 
to a limited set of possible responses (Power Star), engaged in late but highly intensive adoption. As 
the CEO was focused on being an innovative family that cares about quality, the firm engaged in 
numerous incremental (and thus technologically low risk) innovations in the new domain but shied 
away from more substantial changes. 
 The four companies that initially assessed the technology as rather irrelevant concentrated on 
domain offense. The two companies in which the CEOs focused on “emotions and affect” (Peter’s 
Finest, Top Goods) pushed for innovations in their established domains as being (incrementally) 
innovative contributed to their “joy” associated with the firm. The firms of those family CEOs with 
focus on “binding ties” (Retail 2000, White & Blue) concentrated on implementing successful 
concepts in the old domain (mimicry in old domain). In addition, while the CEO of White & Blue 
viewed the technology as irrelevant, his employees disagreed. Thus, White & Blue not only engaged 
in domain offense but also in some cautious, inflexible adoption activities, which mostly copied 
existing solutions in the new domain and were typically abandoned after a short time span.  
 Stage four: Temporal development. Following the characteristic development of 
discontinuous technologies, over time, “digitization” began to become mainstream and it became 
clear that the new technology would prevail. Thus, contrary to the initial phase that lasted roughly 
until the mid-2000s, economic considerations started to offer support for adoption of the 
discontinuous technology. In our case studies, three of the seven firms substantially changed their 
initially chosen adaptation approach over time (arrow g). For instance, the family firm that 
prioritized “transgenerational values” (King’s Goods) substantially increased its initially rather 
cautious investment in adoption as the technology became more mainstream and, thus, more 
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imperative for preserving the family CEO’s economic and non-economic endowments. However, the 
firm’s type of engagement—mimicry of existing solutions—did not change. Similarly, those family 
firms that focused on “enduring ties” with existing customers were forced to change their strategy 
due to economic pressure (White & Blue) as well as the CEO’s increased attention on 
“transgenerational value creation” (Retail 2000). Thus, these CEOs had to find compromise solutions 
that could align their partly diverging economic and non-economic interests. These compromise 
solutions can be characterized as mimicry in the new domain, as the firms copied existing adoption 
approaches. In contrast, those CEOs who prioritized “family reputation” (Power Star) and “power 
and control” (Anything & More) did not substantially alter their adaptation strategies, as their 
initially chosen adaptation approaches were apparently able to continuously satisfy their economic 
and non-economic goals (arrow g). Finally, we found that those family firms that focused on 
“emotions and affect” (Top Goods, Peter’s Finest) prioritized their (current) joy of working in a 
traditional family firm over economic considerations. They therefore did not change their strategies 
throughout the period investigated for this study, even as the technology became more established.. 
DISCUSSION 
Based on a series of seven case studies of German family firms, we revealed the central role of 
CEOs’ non-economic goals in their sensemaking when discontinuous technologies emerge. As 
such, our findings contribute to the evolving stream of research that seeks to understand 
heterogeneity in firms’ adaptation to discontinuous technological change (e.g., Gilbert, 2005, Hill 
and Rothaermel, 2003, König, et al., 2013). In particular, our findings advance knowledge of the 
cognitive antecedents of organizational adaptation (e.g., Kaplan, 2008, Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008, 
Maula, et al., 2013, Tripsas, 2009). While the cognitive frames of key players in incumbent 
organizations are commonly viewed as important precursors for adaptation to discontinuous 
technological change, the role of non-economic goals in this context has largely remained 
underinvestigated (Danneels, 2004). This is surprising given the role that such goals play in 
decision making within family firms (Chrisman, et al., 2012, Chrisman, et al., 2005, Corbetta and 
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Salvato, 2004, Sharma, 2004, Ward, 2004) and given that this type of organization dominates 
economies worldwide (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Notably, the existence of non-economic goals is 
not bound to family influence. For instance, a thirst for personal power, political opinion, or 
ideological beliefs might affect sensemaking and decision making among CEOs. Depending on the 
CEOs’ level of managerial discretion, such factors may, in turn, ultimately affect organizational 
moves in other types of organizations.  
 Moreover, our findings extend the general literature on attention and sensemaking (Ocasio, 
1997, 2011, Weick, 1995), as our model complements previously presented frameworks by 
introducing the effects of non-economic goals. In addition, we provide empirical insights into how 
various dilemmas and ambiguities (Weick, 1995) resulting from the incongruence of simultaneous 
goals shape sensemaking processes and, potentially, affect or hamper decision making. In line with 
Ocasio (1997) and Selznick (1984), as well as recent research in the family business literature 
(Chrisman and Patel, 2012, Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007), we show that some non-economic goals are 
indeed at odds with the company’s economic health. For instance, in the specific context we 
studied, a focus on emotions and affect can result in inertia (König, et al., 2013). However, other 
non-economic goals, such as a desire for power and control or a desire for transgenerational value 
transfer, might lead to a timely recognition of the ongoing trend and thereby be beneficial for the 
achievement of economic goals in the medium and long term. Given the specific context of 
discontinuous technological changes, such non-economic goals are likely to be well aligned with 
economic ones in later phases of development, and they might be mutually reinforcing.  
 Furthermore, our findings emphasize the iterative character of attention, sensemaking, and 
adaptation processes. While various studies have highlighted the importance to study managerial 
attention over time (e.g., Kaplan, 2008, Maula, et al., 2013), it remains unclear how top managers’ 
attention changes and what triggers such a change. Our analysis provides some initial insights into 
how the salience of goals over time (e.g., as succession approaches or the economic evaluation of 
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technologies changes) leads to a re-evaluation of issues and answers that might, in turn, result in 
altered organizational moves.  
 Several major contributions of this study are related to the family business literature. Family 
firm research has long emphasized that the non-economic goals of owning families affect decision 
making and strategic behavior in family businesses (e.g., Chrisman and Patel, 2012, Gomez-Mejia, 
et al., 2007, Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). However, this research has remained surprisingly silent 
about the precise mechanisms that link non-economic goals of owning family members to 
organizational behavior. Our research sheds light on these micro-processes by revealing how non-
economic goals can affect key decision makers’ perceptions of emerging challenges, the set of 
considered responses, and subsequent organizational moves. The integration of research on 
attention with the family business literature thus appears to be a promising path towards a better 
understanding of family firm behavior, especially with regard to the role of non-financial goals. 
Therefore, the application of our model might not be limited to the context of discontinuous 
technological change. It may also be relevant in other contexts that require attention of decision 
makers, such as institutional changes (Nigam and Ocasio, 2010) or mergers and acquisitions (Yu, 
Engleman and Van de Ven, 2005).  
 In addition, our results highlight the need to differentiate among the specific non-economic 
goals pursued by CEOs of owning families. This is important, as our results show that different 
aspects of non-economic goals might lead to substantial deviations in organizational behavior (see 
Table 2). We therefore complement recent empirical observations of goal diversity within family 
firms (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013) by shedding light on the consequences of goal heterogeneity.  
 Related to the heterogeneity of non-economic goals in family firms is the observed 
heterogeneity in the key decision makers’ time horizons. With few notable exceptions (e.g., 
Chrisman and Patel, 2012), research has paid little attention to variations in the time horizons of 
family firms. This is surprising, as some evidence indicates that family firms adopt a long-term 
focus (e.g., Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2006), while other studies suggest that family firms focus 
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on the short-term maximization of socioemotional wealth (e.g., Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007). Our 
empirical results may serve as initial evidence that specific non-economic goals are associated with 
certain time horizons. For instance, in our sample, a focus on emotions and affect was associated 
with short-term planning horizons, whereas a focus on transgenerational values was associated with 
time horizons of up to 30 years.  
 Our study also contributes to the ongoing discussion on innovation and technology adaptation 
in family firms (e.g., Carnes and Ireland, 2013, De Massis, et al., 2013). Despite increasing 
scholarly interest in family firms’ adaptation to discontinuous technological change (e.g., Bergfeld 
and Weber, 2011, König, et al., 2013), our understanding is still incomplete. Previous studies 
emphasize, for instance, the capabilities and structures of family firms (e.g., Carnes and Ireland, 
2013, König, et al., 2013) and the role of family members in terms of being “excellent in managing 
[radical] innovation” (Bergfeld and Weber, 2011, p. 92) and thus help to understand how family 
firms differ from non-family firms in terms of adaptation to fundamentally changing environments 
(König, et al., 2013). We contribute to this literature stream by empirically revealing that there is 
also substantial heterogeneity of response patterns among family firms and by linking this variance 
to differences in CEOs’ non-economic goals.  
 One of the goals of this study was to contribute to open the “black box” of technology 
adoption by revealing not only whether family firms adopt a new technology but also how that 
adoption process takes place. So far, family business scholars mostly focused on the effects of 
innovation input and output variables (De Massis, et al., 2013). Our study, however, sheds light on 
the CEOs’ sensemaking processes and identified ambiguities and dilemmas that challenged family 
firm CEOs under certain conditions. Our findings not only contribute to explaining why family 
firms do or do not adopt discontinuous technologies but also to explaining how they do it. As 
outlined in our individual case descriptions and the cross-case analysis, we show that the studied 
family firms used a broad range of adaptation types, ranging from innovation in the old domain to 
mimicry in the new domain, as well as different levels of innovations in the new domain.  
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LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
Despite the above-mentioned contributions, our study has some limitations, many of which are 
inherent in most qualitative research. First, we cannot rule out that biases in our respondents’ 
reflections affected our research results. Accordingly, one could argue that our focus on few, 
selected interviewees per company distorted our results. However, this focus is rooted in the nature 
of our research question—our main goal was to understand the non-economic goals of decision 
makers that influence their interpretation of a discontinuous technological change and the resulting 
organizational moves. Given the organizational and hierarchical structures of our sampled firms, 
those aspects are often only known by the family CEOs, who were our informants. Whenever 
possible, we triangulated the interview data with information from other sources. Our focus on 
CEOs is also in line with extant theory that emphasizes the role of leadership in explaining variance 
in adaptations to discontinuous technological changes (Gerstner, et al., 2013, Tellis, 2006). 
However, we encourage future research that specifically explores goal diversity within the owning 
family and its effect on organizational moves in the context of discontinuous change. Collecting 
responses from the various family members would also shed light on whether respondents speak on 
behalf of the owning family or whether their statements referred to their individual perceptions.  
Moreover, as in most case study research, interview statements referring to past sensemaking 
processes might be affected by retrospective biases (Gavetti and Rivkin, 2007, Gilbert, 2005). We 
took two methodological precautions to alleviate this risk. First, when defining the research setting, 
we deliberately selected an industry in which the discontinuous technology had occurred relatively 
recently in order to minimize retrospective bias among respondents. Second, we drew on extensive 
longitudinal primary and secondary material, such as the content of historical websites, press 
releases, and press articles, to triangulate our data.  
Furthermore, researchers working with qualitative data need to be aware of alternative 
explanations of the observed phenomena and take measures to rule them out (Yin, 1994). Potential 
alternative explanations in our setting relate to differences in firm size, firm age, product portfolios, 
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governance structures, orientation (family versus business), general innovativeness, and CEO 
characteristics. By being aware of this hazard and by paying particular attention to such factors 
when conducting the interviews and analyzing the data, we aimed to mitigate the risk that an 
alternative explanation might serve as a better explanation of the observed phenomena. Future 
research should nevertheless control for these factors, as for instance, firm size might limit the 
extent of resources available for adaptation moves.  
Moreover, we argued that the discontinuous technology was initially considered unprofitable. 
We have to acknowledge, however, that an economically driven real options valuation might have 
encouraged financially driven firms as well as the sampled family firms, which we characterized by 
initially low adoption intensity, to invest cautiously in the discontinuous technology from early on.  
Caution is also required when aiming to transfer our findings to other contexts. While the 
overall model is likely to be widely applicable, the specific effect of non-economic goals and their 
alignment with economic goals might substantially depend on the specific context.  
 We also encourage family business scholars to investigate other elements of the attention-
based view, especially the family firm’s procedural and communication channels (Ocasio, 1997). 
Such investigations would strengthen our understanding of the spatial, temporal, and procedural 
contexts in organizations that guide decision makers’ focus on attention (Stinchcombe, 1987). 
MANAGERIAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
By building on evidence from multiple case studies, we discussed how the non-economic goals of 
German family firms affected their CEOs’ sensemaking and, ultimately, their organizational 
adaptations to discontinuous technological changes. However, many decision makers in family 
firms are not fully aware of these goals and their consequences. We show that transparency with 
regard to the prevailing non-economic goals, and awareness of the consequences for firm strategy 
and behavior are crucial for any family firm that is facing an emerging discontinuous technological 
change. Christensen (2006, p. 48) states that “disruption is a relative phenomenon. … It is a 
business model problem, not a technology problem.” Given the heterogeneous reactions of family 
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firms to discontinuous technological changes despite their initially similar business models, we 
extend this statement to the following: “It is not only a business model problem. It is also a problem 
of the CEOs’ prevailing goals.”  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1—Case Data 
Company Main activities; age; generation; size Interviews Web archive  Additional data 
Anything & More Consumer good products and retail (non-food); 100 % family owned; 2nd generation; employees: > 
10.000;  
2 internal Directors 2012 Press releases 2002-2012, press articles; 
festschrift 
King’s Goods Consumer good products and retail (food and non-food); 100% family owned; 5th generation; 
employees: > 10.000 
Family CEO;  
CFO 
2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012 
Annual reports and press releases 2002-
2012; store visit, press articles 
Power Star Consumer good products and retail (non-food); 100% family owned, 3rd generation; employees: ~ 600 Family CEO 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012 
Annual report 2010, press articles 
Retail 2000 Consumer good products and retail (food and non-food); 100% family owned, 5th generation; 
employees: > 10.000 
Family CEO; 
Head of communication 
1999, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012 
Store visit, press articles, Orbis 
White & Blue Consumer good products and retail (food and non-food); 100% family owned, 3rd generation; 
employees: ~ 2.000 
Family CEO 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008, 2010, 2012 
Book on White & Blue’s organizational 
history; store visit, press articles, Orbis 
Top Goods Consumer good products and retail (non-food); 100% family owned; 4th generation; employees: ~ 200 Family CEO 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 
2010, 2012 
Product brochure, press articles 
Peter’s Finest Consumer good products and retail (non-food); 100% family owned; 4th generation; employees: ~ 50 Family CEO 1997, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 
2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 
Press articles 
Not case specific Experts (industry experts, other family business owners, family business consultants) 18 n/a Several industry and market outlooks 
Sum  28 67  
All names of companies and CEOs are sanitized throughout the paper as confidentiality was guaranteed to all interview partners. 
 
Table 2—Cross-case Analysis 
Dimension Anything & More King’s Goods Power Star Retail 2000 White & Blue Top Goods Peter’s Finest Economic case 
 Center of Attention 
 
Power and Control  Transgenerational Value Family Reputation  Enduring Ties  Enduring Ties  Emotion and Affect  Emotion and Affect  Economic goals  
1st stage: CEO’s 
Initial Interpretation 
of Issue (arrow a) 
relevant and urgent  relevant yet not urgent relevant and urgent non-relevant (and thus non-urgent)   non-relevant; yet ambiguity due 
to employees’ interpretation as 
relevant (arrow c) 
non-relevant (and 
thus non-urgent)   
non-relevant (and 
thus non-urgent)   
mostly non-
relevant (and thus 
non-urgent)   
2nd stage: CEO’s 
Initial Set of 
Responses 
(arrows b & d) 
largely unconstrained  largely unconstrained  substantially constrained 
by desired family 
reputation; dilemma due 
to  misalignment to 
interpretation (arrow e) 
substantially constrained by desire to 
avoid disruption of ties 
substantially constrained by 
desire to avoid disruption of ties 
n.a. 
(constrained to 
status quo) 
 
n.a. 
(constrained to status 
quo) 
constrained to 
financial 
profitability  
3rd stage: Initial 
Organizational 
Moves (arrow f) 
early domain creation, 
with high intensity and 
flexibility; substantial 
innovation in new 
domain 
early domain creation, with 
low intensity; mimicry in 
new domain 
late domain creation, with 
high intensity; 
incremental innovation in 
new domain 
domain offense activities; mimicry in 
old domain 
domain offense activities 
(mimicry);low intensity; domain 
creation (mimicry) 
domain offense 
activities; 
innovation in old 
domain 
 
domain offense 
activities and 
retrenchment into 
niche; innovation in 
old domain 
domain offense   
4th stage: Temporal 
Development 
(arrow g potentially 
stimulate additional 
cycle(s) through 
model) 
positive evaluation: 
continuance of initial 
adaptation pattern 
“learning of failure” 
re-evaluation:  
increased attention on 
economic goals generates 
perception of urgency; 
increased intensity of 
adoption  
positive evaluation: 
continuance of initial 
adaptation 
re-evaluation:  
increased attention on 
transgenerational value leads to 
interpretation as relevant and urgent; 
dilemma due to misalignment to set of 
answers (arrow e); start of domain 
creation (mimicry) 
re-evaluation: 
increased attention on economic 
goals leads to interpretation as 
relevant and urgent; 
dilemma due to misalignment to 
set of answers (arrow e);  
increased intensity of adoption 
positive 
evaluation: 
continuance of firm 
activities   
positive evaluation: 
continuance of firm 
activities 
re-evaluation: 
economic goals 
lead to 
interpretation as 
relevant and 
urgent; domain 
creation  
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Figure 1—A Model of Family Firm Adaptation to Discontinuous Technologies 
 
 
